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Abstract 
Drawing upon anthropological theory of resistance and testing its 
limits, I will present a closer observation on how dissenting voices to the 
state project of Sharia in contemporary Aceh look on the ground. 
Without thereby renouncing its violent effects, some ethnographic 
stories I recount in this writing will reveal how the implementation of 
Sharia in contemporary Aceh has created inherently amusing situations 
and how it has occasionally become a humor producing machine.  
Keywords: Sharia, Aceh, Political Humor, Postcolonial, Anthropology 
“The worst enemy of authority is, therefore, 
disdain and the safest means to undermine 
respect is laughter” (Hannah Arendt, 1970 : 45) 
A. Introduction
 On June 12, 2015, I was at the Gampong Pineung Mosque, 
Banda Aceh. I joined a group of journalists who came there to report a 
public caning. Since 2010, along with my journalist friends I have 
attended more than 20 public canings across the Aceh province, 
collecting stories and observing people’s attitudes toward the revival of 
this classical form of spectacle punishment.1 Similar to the previous 
canings I attended, as the congregation comes out from Friday prayers I 
heard an announcement from inside the mosque calling for the 
offenders to be brought to the stage. An official came onto the stage and 
read out the judge’s disposition from the Sharia Court. The first 
offender was taken out of the paddy wagon; she was a female. The 
official read through a microphone that the woman was arrested for 
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having pre-marital sex. A sharia police (known in Aceh as WH, abbr.. 
Wilayatul Hisbah) escorted her onto the stage. The official from the 
Sharia Court continued to announce that the offender will get eight 
strokes. The caning will not hurt, he said, as it is only intended to inflict 
shame. At the same time, a number of people who previously attended 
the Friday sermons hurriedly left the mosque yard. I have also seen this 
paradox several times. It became typical, nonetheless, but I came to 
realize how worth paying attention to it. In order to comprehend the 
reason why they were leaving the yard while others joined, I confronted 
and asked why they leave the arena. This time someone replied me “I 
am hungry, can’t skip my lunch in order to see this hipokrit thing.”2 
Another man told me calmly that “Islam doesn’t teach you to humiliate 
people in front of public.”3 But, still, many people remained before the 
stage. 
Meanwhile, the person administering the punishment, who was 
holding a rattan cane about a metre and a half long and wearing a ninja-
like mask, came on the stage. This person is known asthe algojo. The 
official with a microphone gave the flagellator instructions to begin, and 
started to count from “one!”. Just a moment before the algojo hit the 
female offender with the rattan cane, she raised her hand and said that 
she needed to take something from her pocket. She took out a 
smartphone and took a selfie of her dancing body as she moved. The 
entire audience bursted out in laughter, including the officials. But it 
did not take a while, soon after she was insulted by the audience. They 
shouted and mocked her, ordering the algojo to strike her. The algojo 
delivered the punishment, striking her back eight times while she 
shouted, “I don’t feel ashamed! I don’t feel ashamed!”. The next 
offender, a male, was brought onto the stage and he got 10 strokes. The 
punishment was then declared over and everyone left. 
When one reads about spectacle punishment reenacted in present-
day Aceh Michael Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison 
(1977) might come into one’s mind. In this seminal work Michel 
Foucault traces profound changes in Western penal system from public 
torture to prison. Foucault starts by contrasting two stories of penalty: 
the public torture of Damien, the regicide in the mid-18 century, and 
the exhibition of the prisoners a century later. Foucault warns the 
readers about the disappearance of the public executions marking the 
emergence of bio-power and the capitalist mode of production via the 
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confluence of discipline. On the contrary, the modern Sharia state of 
Aceh seems to work in the opposite direction. Gaining significant 
support from Islamist groups and local elites, the local government 
adopted and modified forms of medieval Islamic punishment to have 
them incorporated within the instrument of modern state power. 
Hundreds of caning stages have been set up throughout the Aceh 
province where bodies of the Sharia violators will be put on display and 
hit by the executioners.  
Despite the fact that the above execution is definitely a public, 
highly visible ceremony, what is different about the Sharia punishment 
and the public physical punishment we read about in Foucault’s 
Discipline and Punish is that the intention of physical punishment in 
present day Aceh is not torture nor to create useful individuals in order 
to increase the convict’s productive efficiency, but shaming. What are 
the actual the intended effects of public shaming? Why did the female 
offender respond in such a theatrical, if not humorous, way? What is the 
relationship between the audience to state power? And to what extent is 
Sharia intended to further the state’s project of extracting knowledge 
about Aceh and the Acehnese? 
Many scholars have documented the implementation of Sharia 
law in Aceh (see for example in Hooker 2003; Blackburn 2004; Lindsey 
and Hooker 2007; Salim 2008; Buehler  2008; Ramly 2010; Fanani 
2011; Feener 2013; Reed 2015), but only a few paid attention to a 
tension between state actors and non-state actors over the legitimacy, 
significance, and effectiveness of the implementation.4 
Here I choose to focus on “unintended effect” of the 
implementation of Sharia, looking at phenomena which unintentionally 
turned the Sharia regime of Aceh to become a humor producing 
machine. How is it possible such ritual punishment I describe above be 
fertile for political humor? Furthermore, how do we determine whether 
satirical action is resistance? I will examine what constitutes political in 
humor and vice versa, how humor can become subversive and how they 
became part of the set of actions that oppositional non-movements use 
against the Sharia regime in Aceh. 
In the following section, I will provide a historical backdrop for 
this present research. My approach to discuss the implementation of 
Sharia in Aceh will be a broad adaptation of the analysis of “la longue 
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duree”, a historical totality in space and time, as invoked by French 
historian Fernand Braudel (1980). In searching “ways to produce 
ethically responsible knowledge in a world riven by violence and 
dominative forms of power” (Murphy et.al 2011), I owe to the very 
tradition of many anthropologists working on Indonesia undertaking an 
interdisciplinary project joining ethnography and history (see for 
example Siegel 1969, 1986;  Steedly 1993, 2013; Tsing 1993; Pamberton 
1997; Spyer 2000; Li 2001; Stoler 2008; Strassler 2010; Rutherford 
2013). Juxtaposing people’s attitudes toward the implementation of the 
law with local political histories, the following section will examine the 
meaning of today’s calls for the application of the Sharia in Aceh, the 
extent to which some Acehnese see it as an extension or a departure 
from previous forms of Islamic punishment while some others see it in 
the opposite direction. 
B. Aceh History and the Modern State Project of Sharia
 In 1619 a French armed expedition led by General Augustin De 
Beaulieu sailed to Sumatra. The fleet, known as the “Fleet of 
Montmorency,” arrived in Bandar Aceh in 1621 and remained in the 
city port for approximately 6 months (from January 30 to July 25). At 
that time, the sultanate of Aceh Darussalam was already a center of 
trade and military power in Southeast Asia. Being in Aceh for six 
months, Beaulieu observed and left us one of the best accounts of 
Acehnese society in the early 17th century. It was the period when Aceh 
was under the reign of Iskandar Muda, who ruled the sultanate from 
1607 to 1636. The image of the Sultan’s power has been central in the 
Acehnese popular memory until today. Iskandar Muda is remembered 
as the greatest ruler and lawgiver of Aceh, the Shadow of God on earth 
who once ruled Aceh in accordance with the Book of Allah.  
 In his accounts, Beaulieu put details that are gripping enough for 
us to imagine how absolute and unchallenged the Sultan’s power was. 
With regard to the enforcement of the Sharia law, Beaulieu writes “every 
day the King would have people’s noses cut off, eyes dug out, 
castrations, feet cut off, or hands, ears and other parts mutilated, very 
often for some very small matter” (cf. Reid 1995: 67). But, as Beaulieu 
continues, “no one who has been punished in this way (mutilated), 
whether by the King’s order or by the judge’s, suffers any disgrace on 
this account, no matter what crime he has committed; and if anyone 
taunts him about it, and he kills him in retaliation, he will not be 
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punished for this, since they consider that the culprit has been 
sentenced by a judge and has paid a sufficient penalty. He should not be 
blamed any further for this crime, as anyone can make a mistake” (Reid 
1995: 68).    
 From the last sentence of De Beaulieu’s story, quoted above, we 
can quickly notice a sharp contrast between the physical punishment 
under the Sultan and the physical punishment as “re-enacted” by the 
contemporary Sharia authority in Aceh. As I have underlined above, the 
purpose of the contemporary Sharia punishment is not to inflict pain but 
inflicting shame upon the offenders. This of course doesn’t match with the 
romanticized Sharia laws under the sultan, which clearly protected 
people from any disgrace after they fulfilled the punishment.Such an 
inconsistency, as far as I am concerned, has never been discussed in any 
contemporary “discursive debates,” to use Talal Asad’s concept, 
concerning the extent to which the current implementation of the laws 
depart from previous forms of Islamic punishment. Besides being 
implemented as a result of political negotiation, in the early days of its 
contemporary implementation, one could argue that nothing was 
important for Acehnese Muslims more than to withstand any attempt to 
challenge the importance of religion in their lives (Siegel 2014). That is 
convincing when one thinks of colonialism (the rule of unbelievers), the 
bloody armed conflict, and the tsunami that accompanied the history of 
this region. 
 Acehnese history for the last two centuries is a series of 
catastrophes. Defeat by the Dutch, failure to gain Japanese support after 
aiding them, then a revolution that knocked local leaders out of office 
but that left nothing satisfactory to replace them (Siegel 2012). Since 
then, it appears to be impossible to write about Aceh without 
mentioning Islam and resistance. Both terms feature prominently and 
appear almost intertwined in most studies about history of Aceh and 
Acehnese politics. Islam takes central stage in the construction of 
Acehnese identity as inscribed in an Acehnnese proverb “lagee zat ngon 
sifeut,“ ‘inseparable, like essence and its attribute’ (see more in Siegel 
1969; Alfian 1997; Aspinall 2009; Graft 2010; Samuels 2012; Kloos 
2013). A romanticized past of Acehnese resistance to Dutch colonialism 
made this construction stronger. Acehnese bravery and rebelliousness 
are inscribed in stories of the Holy War against the colonial infidels. 
Acehnese historical recognition no doubt owes a lot to the presence of 
Islam in the region and the image of the colonial enemy. The role of the 
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ulama, Muslim religious clerics, who led the struggles, is glorified to 
emphasize the centrality of Islam to the movement’s ideology (Alfian 
Sjamsuddin 1985; Reid 1979; Sulaiman 1999;). Acehnese orientation 
towards political resistance and Islamic identity were further reinforced 
during the National Revolution (1945-1949) and became complex after 
national independence. In the eyes of the Indonesian central 
government, Aceh has always been a special and troublesome part of the 
nation. The history of Acehnese resistance to the Dutch was essential to 
national identity and narratives of liberation from the colonizer, yet 
Aceh heroism and exceptionalism threatened Indonesian nationalism 
(Drexler 2008). What follows after that were stories about Muslims 
opposing Muslims.  
 In 1953, after wholeheartedly supporting Indonesia’s struggle for 
independence, Aceh started to clash with Jakarta. The first Acehnese 
revolt against the central government began when their leaders 
proclaimed allegiance to Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia under 
Imam Kartosuwiryo. The idea of Indonesia was still there; the struggle 
aimed to make Indonesia more Islamic. Soekarno saw Islam was the 
cause, and thus it became the solution to be offered. Sharia law was 
granted for Aceh in a ceasefire, which was agreed upon in 1959. In May 
1959 Aceh became the Special Region (Daerah Istimewa) of Aceh. This 
gave Aceh autonomy in the fields of religion, customs, and education 
(van Dijk 1981; Sjamsuddin 1985). Only three months after the 
ceasefire, Soekarno proclaimed a return to the 1945 constitution. The 
ceasefire accomplished nothing. This provoked tension and 
dissatisfaction of the Acehnese with the central government.    
 In 1976, another revolt emerged after the forces of Suharto 
monopolized Acehnese resources (Tiro 1982; Kell 1995; Hasan 2000). 
The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) sought to establish an independent 
state, and this rebellion movement was essentially secular-nationalist in 
orientation (Aspinal & Crouch 2002; Schulze 2004; Patria 2009; 
Aspinall 2008, 2009, 2013). The Indonesian Army, through its 
notorious special forces (Kopassus), sought to crush this bid. They 
designated Aceh as a “special combat zone” (Daerah Operasi 
Militer/DOM), leading to the death and disappearance of thousands of 
Acehnese. According to many studies of the Aceh conflict, exploitation 
of natural resources and human rights abuses, thus not Islam, was the 
main cause behind the desire of the Acehnese people to secede from 
Indonesia (Sulaiman 1999; Siapno 2002; Sukma 2004; Reid 2006; 
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Schulze 2004, 2007; Drexler 2008; Patria; Aspinall, 2009). In 1999 
when almost two million Acehnese gathered in front of the Grand 
Mosque of Banda Aceh, what they demanded was not an independent 
state but the need for security, prosperity and a sense of belonging after 
the protracted three decades civil war between GAM and the 
Indonesian military, which killed at least 20,000 Acehnese. But the 
central government again misunderstood the Acehnese voice. 
In the subsequent part I will show how this misunderstanding 
went on and eventually led to a backlash from some ordinary Acehnese.  
C. Sharia as the Modern State Project
In 1999, as an effort to quell the GAM and presumably to prevent 
the Acehnese public from joining the movement, the central 
government granted the implementation of Sharia to the Aceh province. 
Granting Sharia law to the Aceh province was of course a political 
experiment since it goes against the basic principles of Indonesia’s 
Pancasila state ideology. Hamzah Haz, the Indonesian vice president at 
that time, told the press that the decision to apply Sharia in Aceh was 
“uji coba,” a test (Amal & Panggabean, 2003: 58). President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri signed into law an autonomy package that included 
comprehensive regulations on establishing Shariah courts and Shariah 
bylaws. Based on that legislation that was drafted, discussed, and 
approved in Jakarta, Aceh established its first Sharia court in 2003.  
 As I am writing this article, Sharia law has been implemented in 
the Indonesian province of Aceh for more than 15 years. Under the law 
No.44/2001, Sharia was officially promulgated as part of special 
autonomy status granted by the central government of Indonesia to end 
the Aceh conflict. At first, many Acehnese also perceived the 
implementation of Sharia would be the answer to the pervasive 
corruption and injustice spread during the conflict. It came together 
with a longing for the glorious past of Aceh. The Acehnese elites who 
supported the Sharia proposal had actively tried to convince people that 
in precolonial times Islamic law had already been implemented in Aceh, 
and its modern absence was only due to the impact of European 
colonialism (Ali Muhammad 2003: 327, cf. Basri 2010: 271; Hefner 
2011).  
 With the establishment of the Office of Islamic Sharia (Dinas 
Syariat Islam), Sharia Courts (Mahkamah Syariat) and the Sharia Police 
(Wilayatul Hisbah), all Sharia instruments were complete and ready to 
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perform. The result has been a number of bylaws (officially called qanun) 
promoting ‘correct’ Islamic behaviour, forbidding non-Sunni practices 
and beliefs, making punishable acts like gambling (maisir) and the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages (khamr), giving local authorities the 
power to act upon and punish illicit sexual relations (khalwat), and 
introducing corporal punishment with the use of rattan cane in public.  
 However, it was not until after the tsunami and the end of the 
political conflict that the new laws and institutions became widely visible 
and active in the province. The Sharia authority publicly caned its first 
Sharia violator in 2005. Why in 2005 and not during the previous five 
years? Many insiders observers assumed that it had to do with another 
catastrophe that hit the region and its subsequent development (see for 
example in Kloos 2014; Samuels 2009). The tsunami that struck many 
Southeast Asian countries on 26 December 2004 hit the Aceh province 
hardest. The tsunami wave killed almost 300,000 Acehnese in less than 
one hour after the powerful earthquakes and caused tremendous, long-
lasting suffering in the coastal areas of Aceh. The force of natural 
disaster finally revealed larger social and political problem of Aceh, 
which had previously been hidden from international view (Good et al. 
2008; Good & Good 2013; Samuels 2012; Good, Good & Grayman 
2015). Within a month of the tsunami, peace negotiation were resumed, 
which led to a peace agreement being signed in Helsinki, Finland, on 
August 15, 2005.  
 The province that was totally closed off to foreigners prior to the 
tsunami was suddenly opened to the wider world. At the same time, the 
intensity of Sharia law implementation dramatically increased. The fear 
of foreign influence, conversion to other religions, and radical ideas 
began to develop (or be incited) along with the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation projects in Aceh (Kloos 2014, 2015). The upholding of 
morality and waging of war on all forms of immorality became the main 
agenda of Sharia authority. Through local regulation (Qanun or ‘Perda,’ 
Peraturan Daerah), Sharia matters have been institutionalized into a 
government agency. More Sharia Police were recruited, and they have 
finally been integrated into civilian police units (Satpol PP) in order to 
increase the agency’s force to intervene. Those are the officials who 
nowadays go on patrols to guard against anything considered a threat to 
Sharia implementation.   
 Furthermore, the peace agreement between the GAM and the 
Indonesian Government successfully transformed former members of 
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the combatants into administrators, constructing a new circle of elites. 
This transformation also created opportunities and new spaces for 
economic and socio-political competition and contestation. GAM 
transformed and brought its former members into a local political party, 
known today as Partai Aceh (The Aceh Party). This party won general 
elections in 2006 and 2012, and now occupying most of political 
positions within the local government of Aceh. Ironically, many former 
GAM members who previously refused to accept the Sharia proposal are 
now supporting the implementation of Sharia laws. They found 
“Sharia” useful as a means ofpolitical control, and today they have 
extended its force into a more com plex ensemble of legal practices and 
institutions. After the peace deal, the conditions of military emergency 
returned under the guise of Sharia. Spying, raids, detention and all 
kinds of prohibitions employed during the military emergency have 
been re-implemented by Sharia authorities. The current political 
situation in Aceh after the armed conflict might resonate to what has 
been discussed in many anthropological studies about the irony in the 
“postcolony,” where power inequalities continue to persist in a host of 
different ways as the former colonized elites embody the role of 
colonizer (Mbembe 1986, 1992; Comaroff & Comaroff 2006; Ferguson 
2007; Good et al. 2008; Steedly 2013).  
A number of new controversial regulations in the name of Sharia 
have been endorsed and executed by many GAM former combatants, 
those who have become popular local political figures in the last decade. 
In 2010, the local government of West Aceh issued a qanun forbidding 
women to wear jeans and ‘tight’ clothing. This regulation was 
subsequently followed by the more odd qanun issued by the regent of 
South Aceh, Husein Yusuf, who strangely prohibited male civil servants 
from having mouthaches. In the North, the Mayor of Lhokseumawe, 
Suaidi Yahya, in 2011 promulgated his own Sharia law banning women 
from straddling motorcycles. The nature of Sharia laws seem to vary 
arbitrarily from region to region within the province. The city of Banda 
Aceh and Meulaboh, West Aceh, have restricted any form of outdoor 
and indoor performing arts that do not strictly conform to Sharia law. 
To hold an event or an art performance in Aceh requires passing 
through three hoops to obtain three different permissions; from the 
municipality, from the Sharia Office, and from the Aceh Ulama 
Council. Failure to obtain permission from any one of these may result 
in the event being declared illegal and able to be shut down. Moreover, 
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the implementation of a night curfew in several areas, such as North, 
East, Central Aceh and Banda Aceh, play a large part in extinguishing 
enthusiasm for the performing arts across the region. 
It is important to note that from the early days of its 
implementation, dissenting voices to the state project of Sharia have 
emerged and come from various segments of society. They might vary by 
education, political views, and gender. From a legal point of view, 
attempts to enforce Islamic laws in Indonesia have almost always 
resulted in conflict among competing systems of law and customary or 
civil law (Bowen 2003; Salim 2008; Hefner 2008). From political point 
of view, I have indicated above that before the GAM leaders signed the 
peace agreement with the Indonesian government, they used to be a 
leading voice to reject the Sharia proposal. They also received supports 
from some elements in the Acehnese society. From civil society point of 
view, there were two groups critical to the central government’s Sharia 
proposal. I divided them into two groups because they have different 
visions on the subject matter. The first group was dominated by the 
traditionalist Muslim scholars, known as the dayah Ulama. Tgk 
Nuruzzahri or Waled Nu, was one of the influential Aceh ulama who 
once told in a public seminar that the Sharia (in Acehnese, syari’at) 
applied now in Aceh actually means ‘syari ‘ab’ (Acehnese slang, lit. look 
for a free meal), a project to feed the government officers. He made fun 
of it by using that local term and called the proposal was no more than 
‘tipu Sukarno’ or Sukarno’s trick to prevaricate the Acehnese people. He 
referred to the Sukarno’s policy to end the DI/TII movement in 1950s 
where the central government also granted Sharia in order to win the 
heart of the Acehnese. However, the dayah Ulama’s views on the 
current government’s interpretations of Sharia have always been 
ambivalent. While they urge the local government of Aceh not to “play” 
with a partial understanding of Islamic law, they also demand Sharia 
should be implemented stronger and thoroughly (kaffah), and ask the 
government to consul with them before passing the regulations. In other 
words, they would have been supportive to the implementation of the 
law had they were involved to determine what constitutes Sharia in the 
regulations (Fuadi, 2001).  
Furthermore, there was another group comprised human rights 
activists and university intellectuals. They rejected Sharia proposal on 
the basis of human rights understanding. Many of them were aware that 
Sharia will be transformed into and back up by the military forces to 
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expand their control upon public aspiration (Sjamsuddin-Ishak 2002). 
Critical reviews on the Sharia proposal were raised by some Acehnese 
intellectuals such as Fuad Mardhatillah (2009), Affan Ramly (2010), 
Husni Mubarak A. Latief (2010), Teuku Harits Muzanni, Asrizal Luthfi 
(2011) and Teuku Muhammad Jafar Sulaiman. (2011). In 2009, a 
significant number of human right activists established a joint forum to 
be named Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil Peduli Syariat - JMSPS (Civil Society’s 
Network Concerning Sharia). This forum comprises several local NGOs, 
such as the Human Rights-NGO coalition, Aceh Legal Aid Foundation 
(LBH), Relawan Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan (women volunteers for 
humanitarian issues), Flower Aceh, KKTGA, Komunitas Tikar Pandan, 
Aceh Judicial & Monitoring Institute, Violet Grey, Women Voice 
Radio, Gender Work ing Group, SEIA, Fatayat Nahdatul Ulama, 
Sekolah Menulis Dokarim, Kontras Aceh, Center for Human Rights 
Studies-Unsyiah, Sri Ratu Safiatuddin Foundation and others. In 2010 
the JMSPS group successfully pushed governor Irwandi Yusuf to 
postpone the implementation of the qanun Jinayah ( Islamic Penal Law ). 
Broadly speaking, since the Sharia laws in Aceh has been 
implemented through the machinery of an inefficient and 
unprofessional state with a long legacy of corruption, manipulation, and 
authoritarianism, it certainly has not been immune to resistance and 
contestations (Feener 2015; Idria 2015). It has become more visible 
within the last two years, but still far cry from becoming a movement to 
overthrow state power. 
D. On Sharia Contestation & the Function of Humor for the Less
Powerful
 Power and resistance, according to Foucault (1978), are 
correlative concepts. The possibility for resistance to emerge always goes 
hand in hand with histories of groups suffering from power imbalance. 
Foucault also believes that power is not merely sustained by violence and 
coercion. The ability of a regime to make people believe in it or to force 
them to act as if they believed in it lies not only in coercive power but 
also in authority and the capacity to monopolize authority. Theoretically 
speaking, just like power, resistance has become ubiquitous, and there is 
no consensus on what the term actually means. No matter how far one 
travels back in the history of resistance studies, the terminology has 
always been problematic, with significant contradictions and 
disagreements; this remains true in more recent texts (see for example 
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from Foucault 1978; de Certeau 1980; Scott 1985, 1991; Bourdieu 
1991; Wedeen 1999;Hollander & Einwohner 2004; Seymour 2006; 
Duncome 2008; Butcher & Velayutham 2009; Camps-Febrer 2012; 
Medina 2013).  
 Many scholars from a great many disciplinary perspectives across 
the social sciences, ranging from history to anthropology, have been 
involved in resistance studies. Efforts to conceptualize resistance have 
been enormous and rigorous, from choosing “whether any given act fits 
into a fixed box called resistance” (Ortner 1995: 175) to how it is 
formed from relatively organized and fixed movement to less 
institutionalized and more everyday forms of resistance. In both a 
concealed manner or an open confrontation, there are many forms of 
articulations (see for example in Comaroff 1985; Abu Lughod 1986; 
Brown 1996; Kastrinou-Theodoropoulou 2009), practices (Tilly 1977; 
Scott 1985, Adas 1986; Scott 1990; Ong 1987, 2013; Guha 1997; Reed-
Danahay 1993; Collins 2009) and significations (Stoler 1986; Cooper 
1992; Hoffman 1999; Seymour 2009; Lugg 2010), seen as the complex 
network of resistance actions. Regarding everyday forms of resistance, we 
are also equipped with a plenty of useful concepts from E.P Thompson’s 
“counter-theatre” (1993), W.F. Wartheim’s “counterpoint,” and James 
C. Scott’s “weapons of the weak” (1985), to Václav Havel’s “power of 
the powerless” (1985 [1979]). Still, this wide range of studies has shown 
that resistance is a complicated and heterogenous phenomenon.
 The history of Aceh is full of stories of oppressions and of fierce 
resistance, especially against any infringements on its freedom to arrange 
its own affairs. I wish to make clear at this stage that when I refer to the 
word resistance in this present study, I do not mean “resistance” strictly 
in the sense of organized and relatively fixed movement to overthrow 
the government. As I have shown above, there have been enough studies 
concerning that type of resistance overwhelmingly attributed the 
Acehnese almost to the point that one might say that ‘where there are 
Acehnese there is resistance,’ pointing to centuries of Acehnese armed 
struggles in combating colonial powers and a series of armed revolts 
against the Republic.  
 In seeking to map out how Acehnese Muslims “humorous” 
experience in contesting a new authoritarian religious regime, namely 
the Sharia state, I follow James C. Scott’s (1985, 1992, 1996), rather 
than seeing “resistance as organization,” I choose to look at less visible, 
every-day forms of resistance articulated in various modes of 
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articulations, as suggested by Scott, like “foot-dragging, evasion, false 
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and sabotage.” Some 
Sharia resistors explored in my study are indeed adopting defensive 
strategies (i.e., subversion rather than confrontation) and often 
performed their criticism in unconventional manners. I paid attention 
to the line between “public vs hidden transcripts.” This is the line where 
Scott sees the battle for “testing the limits,” where subordinates, unsure 
of dominants’ effective powers, might bring hidden transcripts to a 
public sphere (Scott, 1990: p.192; see also Camps-Febrer 2012). Hidden 
transcripts are usually opposed to the public display of language, rituals 
and behaviors that a group or individual performs in front of others.5 
James Scott’s concepts “weapons of the weak” and “hidden 
transcripts” have been foundational in theorizing resistance in the 
discipline of anthropology. However, in some cases applying the 
concepts “weap ons of the weak” and “hidden transcripts” to attribute 
Acehnese counter-actions against the Sharia authority would have been 
be problematic, since criticism to the state project of Sharia has not 
been merely voiced by less powerful people and not always hidden from 
public. Instead they already became visible as a variety of more powerful 
groups have already involved. With the increasing openness of public 
discourse in post-disaster and post-conflict Aceh, critiques of the Sharia 
authority’s arroganceand hypocrisyspread beyond coffee house 
conversations to take a prominent position in popular media discourse 
(Idria 2013; Feener 2015). Furthermore, there is an intrinsic 
relationship between the sovereign and audience which makes the 
regime able to continue exercise its power through ceremony and the 
spread of violence. People who mock and laugh at the Sharia authority 
in many cases are the same people who deliberately attend ceremony of 
spectacle punishment.  
 This is understandable if one would accept the logic that the 
contemporary Sharia regime is a distinctive regime established in “the 
postcolony,” to use the words of Achille Mbembe, which “seeks to 
institutionalize itself, in order to achieve its legitimacy and hegemony in 
the form of a fetish” (Mbembe 1992: 4). But, by having this logic I 
should then be more specific about what I mean by resistance within 
this study. The term resistance here refers to a distinctive situation that 
arises out of encounters and interactions and derive from “illicit 
cohabitation” between rulers and the ruled who happen to share the 
same living space – a mode of relationship that Mbembe has called it as 
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“mutual zombification” (Mbembe, ibid). A distinctive situation 
unintentionally continues to create amusing situations. Condition best 
described in Anna Tsing’s terminology (2000) of “friction.” Friction is 
not just about slowing things down, but “the awkward, unequal, 
unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference as 
they arise out of encounters and interactions” (Tsing 2000: 4-6). Friction 
can be something very trivial, as she put, “it can be the fly in the 
elephant nose”.  
 Here, in this very context, the complexity of history, Islam and 
the construction of Acehnese identity which always goes hand in hand 
has no doubt contributed to a more complicated power relation 
between the current regime and its subject. A complex situation that 
makes sense when one thinks of how Acehnese identity is so entwined 
with Islam that critical voices to the Sharia project in general are 
subdued due to the fear of being labeled anti-Islam. Therefore, just as 
Sigmund Freud in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1963 
[1907]) claimed, in this very condition humor has become “a survivalist 
response to the vicissitudes of life” in Aceh.6 
 Henk Driessen (2015) points out that the terms humor, joking, 
and laughter are often used interchangeably and are part of the semantic 
field of the comic, which in turn belongs to the domain of expressive 
culture. There is no single acceptable definition of humor, but scholars 
generally agree that it revolves around a sense of the incongruous or 
ludicrous (Driessen 2015: 416). Stuart Hall (1997) points out that 
humorous strategies are powerful in their capacity to “unfix” dominant 
meanings through subversive satire and parody, and to affix new 
meanings that destabilize the underlying assumptions of the stereotype. 
 There have been numerous anthropological studies about the use 
of humor in repressive political settings challenging oppression in a 
different way than traditional resistance (Pi-Sunyer 1977; Johansen 
1991; Stokker 2001; Sorensen 2008; Kazarian 2011). Some researchers 
dealing with the sociology of power and social movements have 
described laughter, political humor, and the like as creative reactions to 
the greatest concentration of power in society, seen as a sublimation of 
aggression, a form of political resistance also used for therapeutic ends 
and for social commentary and critique, and hence a safe release for 
aggressiveness against a superior force (Schutz 1977; Apte 1985; Billig 
2005; Davies 2007; Berdaneh 2011; Wadeen 2011; Zimbardo 2014;). 
There are also a few writers who found comedy at the heart of state 
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power (see for example Bakhtin 1984; Furnivall, Mbembe 1992, 2003; 
Zizek 1993; Rutherford 2012).7 
 Given its specific context, both historical and material, I argue that the 
form of humor under the post-colonial Sharia regime has a far 
greater personal, political, intellectual, and historical importance 
than is the case with sarcasm and satire performed in traditional 
or democratic societies. The fetishization of power through 
ceremony and display of symbols as well as the spread of fear 
through violence and unpredictability directed by mediocre state 
apparatuses make possible carnivalesque encounters to happen 
and allow the oppressed to make fun of the absurdity of their 
situation. Mocking and laughter are parts of these rituals. 
Laughter, coming from examples I collected in my preliminary 
research, is often embodied in carnivalesque situations where 
smiling or laughing came together with feeling uneasy about 
smiling or laughing. Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) has described that the 
carnival is a period of time where normal rules do not apply, the 
social distance between the high and the lowly is diminished,the 
mighty mocks and “the world [is] turned upside down.”  
There is a parallel between the jokes told under the Sharia regime 
in Aceh and the carnival behavior of medieval times when the rites and 
rituals of the Church were burlesqued in Bakhtin’s Rabelais. But I also 
argue that Bakhtinian ideas do not equally apply to all inherently 
amusing situations in Aceh today. It is clearly related to popular protest 
and resistance but the nature of the relationship is very problematic. 
Thus, rather than looking the obscenity and the grotesque merely at 
“non-official” cultures, the province of ordinary people, again I tend to 
follow Achille Mbembe to see the grotesque and the obscene as two 
essential elements intrinsic to all system of domination in the 
postcolony, including under the Sharia regime of Aceh. 
Like other regimes in “the postcolony,” which are characterized by 
a distinctive style of political improvisation, the Sharia regime of Aceh 
has so far effectively adopted and translated Sharia as a distinct set of 
cultural repertoires and powerfully evocative concepts. Yet the regime’s 
aim to discipline the population and to “organize” people’s desire is far 
from successful, to underline it once again, because it runs through the 
machinery of an inefficient and unprofessional state. Mbembe in his 
study also introduces the term “illicit cohabitation” and “mutual 
zombification” to describe forms of postcolonial relationship. It is “a 
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relationship made fraught by the very fact of the commandement and its 
‘subjects’ having to share the same living space” (Mbembe 1992: 4). By 
recognizing these two categories one can also avoid to always describe 
the postcolonial relationship in term of a classic definition of resistance 
or collaboration, rather the grotesque irrationality of power. Thus, it is 
the hallmark of grotesque humor. 
E. Sarcasm and Satire: Shaming the Powerful
 The story from the caning stage I recall in the beginning of this 
article provides us an example how the effect of spectacle punishment 
reenacted by the contemporary Sharia authority went not to the 
direction it aimed, shaming. The action of the woman offender on the 
caning stage, through dance and selfie, and the audience who shouted 
and laughed at her and the authority arguably did not reach that quality. 
Rather, it was perceived just like a performance. The offender action was 
certainly not to tell a joke to anyone who laughed at her. Instead, she 
was sarcastic as in an unexpected way she ridiculed both the authority 
and the audience. Taking selfie was her satirical weapon to mock their 
inability to inflict shame on her. Of course, for an ethnographer, there is 
also a strong moral component to take.  
 Since Acehnese identity is so entwined with Islam, counter-
narratives to the state project of Sharia in general are subdued due to 
the fear of being labelled anti-Islam (see my work and Ichwan, 2011). 
Many individuals critical to the implementation of Sharia tend to adopt 
defensive strategy, subversion rather than confrontation. Pretending to 
follow while disobeying the laws and the authority. In many cases their 
actions very much embedded in sarcasm and satire resulted in conflict 
and competing systems.  
 Counter action to the taken by many people were very much 
embedded in what the locals termed as ulok or meu-ulok (lit. mocking to 
make fun). At first glance, ulok might be equivalent to sarcasm and 
satire, terms conceptualized in humor and interpersonal communication 
studies. Fine & Martin (1990) note that sarcasm is a distinctive style of 
discourse, as a societal form of biting communication, often involving 
the opposite of what is meant, that is “inversion.” Sarcasm announces a 
position, the attitude of the rhetor toward the target, but may miss its 
target with an unsympathetic or naive audience. Satire, as they continue, 
more than most humor, has the reputation of being subtle, so subtle 
that many might miss it. Its rhetorical force often overlaps with that of 
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sarcasm. Satire, at its roots, is profoundly moral. According to Waller 
(2006) the word “satire” from the ancient Greek satyr, the mythical 
drunk, “hedonistic or otherwise naughty man-goat.” Unlike sarcasm, it 
is not necessarily biting or hostile. It always has a moral component. The 
satirist is acutely aware of the gaps between the way that things are and 
the way they should be (Elliot, 1978). For the locals ulok is often inspired 
within unusual political circumstances that allow them to deal with the 
absurdity of their situation.  
 In 2009, Putroe Sejati, a queer community in Banda Aceh, 
hosted a controversial contest called Pemilihan Ratu Waria Aceh (Aceh 
Queer Queen Festival). The contestants wore proper Muslim dress codes 
as instructed by Sharia law. The organizer also followed the official 
protocol to include Quranic recitations and prayers for the opening and 
the closing of the event. As the event was open to the Banda Aceh 
public, Islamist groups were subsequently outraged and demanded the 
dissolution of Putroe Sejati. However, they could not stop the event 
because the organizer was able to show the letter of approval from the 
ulama council and none of these queer contestants attending the event 
were wearing “inappropriate” dress. Provoked by angered Islamist 
groups, the Aceh Ulama Council (MPU) told the press that they were 
fooled by Putroe Sejati members who falsified the permit of the event. 
According to Tgk Muslim Ibrahim, a leading figure of the Aceh ulama 
council and the official that signed the letter of approval for the event, 
Putroe Sejati actually asked for permission only to organize a charity 
concert, without ever mentioning the queer contest in the letter.  
 Furthermore, the public profile of Aceh’s punk community has 
evolved considerably over the past years. As the community grew and 
became more visible, the authority declared the phenomenon as deviant. 
The government of Banda Aceh thus placed the ‘problem’ of punks 
squarely in the context of the implementation of Islamic law. Since 2011 
the government has launched a moral project called pembinaan “to re-
educate” the punks in order to bring them back to the path of Islam 
(Idria, 2015). The state Sharia police regularly crack down, and 
repeatedly stormed the city park where the youngsters usually gathered, 
rounding up anyone wearing punk dress styles, mohawk hair, tattoos 
and chains. In many occasions the Acehnese punks fought back against 
the officials, resulting in open clashes. But, they youngsters also showed 
peculiar, if not subversive, ways in undermining the authority as they 
keep going to gather in the city park next to the Grand Mosque of 
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Baiturrahman, which is the iconic and religious landmark of the city of 
Banda Aceh. The punk members, most of them also wanted to show 
that they are practicing Muslims. They often join the prayers at the 
grand mosque while still wearing their punk clothing, by intention in 
direct confrontation with the more conservative members of the 
mosque.  
 Not only performed by a certain limited group, occasionally, there 
was also a mode of spontaneous action where a large number of people 
involved in disobeying the Sharia law in hilarious ways. The New Year’s 
Eve has become an annual comical event for the Acehnese people, 
especially in the city of Banda Aceh. Every year since 2010, on 31 
December the government of Banda Aceh and the Ulama Council 
(MPU) would repeatedly release a joint announcement to prohibit 
people from celebrating New Year’s Eve, on religious ground. The 
authority ordered the Wilayat al-Hisbah (the Sharia Police) to seal off the 
beach nearby Banda Aceh in order to prevent the unlawful acts of those 
celebrating the event. Fireworks and trumpets sold for the New Year’s 
Eve celebration would be seized, the government announced. However, 
as it happened every year, at midnight of the New Year Eve fireworks 
would explode in the air and trumpets would be sounded everywhere. 
Thousands of people would walk, driving their cars and motorcycles, 
blowing trumpets and illuminating fireworks to the sky of the city of 
Banda Aceh. This kind of situation has been evidently not planned as 
people came out of their own volition to join the celebrations. I 
witnessed several moments when the Sharia Police patrolling the city 
lost their power and were not able to prevent the crowds from 
disobeying their restrictions. Many people would even drive their 
vehicles on the right side of the city road rather than following the rule 
in which one has to do it in reverse. When confronted by the police 
people would argue that they were driving in such a way following 
Islamic values which prefer the right side rather than the left side. 
People also argued that trumpet should not be banned on the New 
Year’s Eve, because there is the angel of the trumpet in Islamic 
eschatology. It was, above all, satirical argument. Many people, mostly 
youngsters, often burst out laughing after arguing with the officials.  
 The above hilarious examples show that in many cases the way 
people of Aceh deal with the new regime of conduct prefer to avoid 
confrontative actions. Instead, they articulate, sometimes negotiate, and 
perform their counter views against the government interpretation of 
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Sharia in ways that require one to grasp and to understand them beyond 
conventional notion. Often embedded in humor, they continue to 
contest and destabilize the power of the Sharia regime.8 
F. Concluding Remark
 As Martin Sorensen has coined “looking more closely at the 
unusual, we can often get more information about the less unusual” 
(Sorensen, 2008: 169), here I provide a counter-narrative to dominant 
media portrayals of Acehnese, often as the most fanatic Muslim 
community in Indonesia and supportive in total to the local government 
project of Sharia. My study first show that despite the more aggressive 
Sharia project directed by the government to have a total control on its 
population, Acehnese attitudes toward the implementation of the law 
have shown otherwise. More and more people have become more open 
to express their critical views challenging the implementation of that 
religious law. Besides, there are some segments of Acehnese society who 
continue to destabilize the government project of Sharia in more subtle 
ways. In many ways they are hilarious.  
 Anthropologists argue that comedy and humor may be used in 
order to break tension, to create a sense of community, to build 
solidarity through in-group inclusion and out-group exclusion, as a 
method of coping with injustice or trauma, as a survival tactic, as a form 
of political resistance, for therapeutic ends, and for social commentary 
and critique (for example in Apte 1985; Billig 2005; Davies 2007; 
Zimbardo 2014; ). As Stuart Hall (1997) notes humorous strategies are 
powerful in the capacity to “unfix” dominant meanings through 
subversive satire and parody, and affix new meanings that destabilize the 
underlying assumptions of the stereotype. However, this subject has 
been ignored in contemporary study of Aceh, and Islam. Attending to 
comedy and anecdote as “unintended effects” of the implementation of 
Sharia, my study offers a different lens on what Sharia means in 
everyday life. Understanding counter views on Sharia beyond the old 
notion of resistance, I found the concepts of both “illicit cohabitation” 
and “mutual zombification” introduced by Achille Mbembe are useful 
to describe the logic, the dynamic and what cause the unstable 
relationship between the dominant and the subordinate in a post 
colonial setting like Aceh. Having this logic made possible for me to 
understand tensions, derive from actions and articulations toward 
Sharia regulations, between the authority and state subject that may be 
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bothering processes of rule and marking limits of sovereign power as it is 
performed. But at the same time, these processes continue to 
productively create metaphors and keep always open for us possibilities 
to grasp the meaning of everyday practices and the constitution of 
society. My work, above all, is timely and challenges dominant narratives 
in popular media that portray Aceh as the most conservative region in 
the Archipelago. Every time there is an incident relating to Sharia law, it 
becomes magnified in the media, contributing to an un-nuanced view of 
the region’s politics. I strongly argue that Aceh is in fact a vibrant open 
society with a complex arrangement of internal political divergences. 
Endnotes: 
1 Using a different angle, I have discussed public caning in Aceh as the state’s 
highly visual politics of re-education through performance in my article “Two Stages 
for Performance in Aceh: From StateConflict to Syariah Politics”, in Barbara Hatley & 
Brett Hough (eds.), Performing Contemporary Indonesia: Celebrating Identity, Constructing 
Community, Leiden - Brill & KITLV (2015), pp. 167-181 
2 “Saya lapar, belum makan siang, ngapain nonton hukuman yang hipokrit 
kayak gini” (fieldnotes transcript 12/06/2015) 
3 “Islam nggak ngajarin bikin malu orang di depan umum” (fieldnotes 
transcript  
12/06/2015) 
4 In our 2011 collaborative research, Moch Nur Ichwan and I study offer an 
alternative bottom up approach in comparison to other works offering top down 
perspective of  Sharia. Our research is published as part of the IRP report entitled  
Regime Change, Democracy & Islam. The Case of Indonesia Leiden: Leiden University 
(2013) 
5 According to James Scott hidden transcripts are those acts of dissent that 
occur within a space and among a group of people that share the same position in a 
given relation of dominance. These transcripts did not usually reach the other side of 
the power relationship because of the reaction they would entail (Scott 1990: 196). 
6 Freud sees humor arises out of internal suppression of subjects. He locates 
the source of humor and comedy in the id which is in a constant struggle with the 
regulatory force of super-ego (Freud 1907, cf Kohlenberger 2015: 135). 
7 The vast majority of anthropologists working on Indonesia have neglected 
humor as a research topic. Some early anthropologists studied humor from the 
perspective of folklore or media performance, but rarely as a resource for cultural 
analysis (see for example in Siegel 1979 & 1986; Sherzer & Sherzer 1987; Boellstorff 
2005). In many ethnographic accounts, humor is not even mentioned in spite of the 
fact that it is a finely calibrated barometer of the preoccupations shared by members of 
a society or group. 
8 There is always the possibility that sarcasm and satire can contribute to 
destabilize and undermine the authoritarian powers (see for example in Kazarian 2010; 
CampsFebrer, 2012 on recent studies concerning the impact of humor in the Arab 
Spring). Majken Jul Sorensen’s study entitled “Humor as a Serious Strategy of 
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Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression” published in Peace & Change, Vol. 33, No.2 
(2008) focuses on an oppositional movement in Serbia called Otpor. This 
extraordinary study brought an example how the impact of humor could bring down 
the oppressive regime of Slobodan Milosevic. 
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